Microeconomic theory · Market design
I am an economist working on matching and mechanism design. I study how to allocate discrete resources when preferences, priorities, and fairness requirements meet feasibility constraints.
Research and Teaching Assistant
Necmettin Erbakan University
P1Job market paper
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
We characterize when spatially constrained many-to-many allocations remain completable and use a maximum-flow test to construct completion-preserving assignments.
P2Submitted
We characterize the smallest worst rank compatible with no-envy and ordinal efficiency, derive sharp rank-loss bounds, and show that Probabilistic Serial can lie far from the optimal no-envy, efficiency, and joint frontiers.
P3Work in Progress
Ongoing work on the design of equitable affirmative-action policies in school choice.
Ph.D. in Economics
M.A. in Economics
B.A. in Economics
8th International Workshop on Matching under Preferences
Many-to-many Matching with Cluster-Approximated Spatial Constraints
Poster presentation
Is the Weighted Sum a Meritocratic Method? A Mechanism Design Approach to Research Assistant Recruitment in Turkey
Conference presentation
Second Spring Meeting of the Turkish Economic Association
Is the Weighted Sum a Meritocratic Method? A Mechanism Design Approach to Research Assistant Recruitment in Turkey
Conference presentation
Equitable Affirmative Action in School Choice
Conference presentation
A Mechanism Design Approach to Research Assistant Recruitment in Turkey
How do weighted scores and GPA normalization shape fairness and incentives in research-assistant recruitment?
A Mechanism Design Approach
How can pharmacy duty schedules satisfy hard feasibility requirements while accounting for fairness and spatial distribution?